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INTRODUCTION 
tatelessness is the lack of legally recognized citizenship. 
This condition affects an estimated twelve million people 
worldwide.1 Because stateless persons are not associated with a 
nation-state, they are frequently overlooked for care.2 The con-
sequences of statelessness frequently lead to compounding hu-
man rights abuses, including human trafficking, oppression, 
and neglect.3 Few solutions exist for statelessness absent com-
pelling nation-states to recognize citizenship. Intercountry 
adoption is another solution for statelessness and coincidental-
ly, as this article will illustrate, intercountry adoption is grow-
ing in demand but contracting in available sending states. This 
Article proposes a nexus of statelessness and intercountry 
adoption where legislation is put forward to adopt stateless in-
dividuals, particularly children. This Article analyzes pending 
legislation for the adoption of North Korean stateless persons 
and recommends legislation to address broader issues of state-
lessness. 
I. INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION BACKGROUND 
The first documented intercountry adoptions began in the 
United States in the late 1940s.4 Ushered in largely by the ef-
fects of World War II, intercountry adoption initially sought to 
assist children orphaned by parents killed in the war.5 The 
                                                                                                             
 1. Stateless People, UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, 
http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c155.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 2. See Jay Milbrandt, Stateless, 20 CARDOZO J. INT’L & COMP. L. 75 (2010). 
 3. Id. 
 4. See Richard R. Carlson, Transnational Adoption of Children, 23 TULSA 
L.J. 317, 321 n.25 (1988) (providing an overview of the impact of World War 
II on intercountry adoption); see also ELIZABETH BARTHOLET & JOAN HEIFETZ 
HOLLINGER, INTERNATIONAL ADOPTION: OVERVIEW, in ADOPTION LAW AND 
PRACTICE §§ 10.02[1], 10.05 to 10.06 (Joan H. Hollinger ed., 2010) (providing 
a brief history of intercountry adoption); Kate O’Keeffe, Note, The Intercoun-
try Adoption Act of 2000: The United States’ Ratification of the Hague Con-
vention on the Protection of Children, and Its Meager Effect on International 
Adoption, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1611, 1615–18 (2007). 
 5. See 56 Orphaned by War Due Today at Idlewild, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 
1949, at 8 (describing how orphans caused by deaths during World War II 
prompted adoptions); How to Adopt a Child in Mexico: Three-Stage Process, 
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 4, 1984, § V, at 26, col. 1. (describing the difficulties of U.S. 
citizens’ adoption of children from Mexico in the 1980s); Ginger Thompson, 
After Haiti Quake, the Chaos of U.S. Adoptions, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 3, 2010), 
S
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United States is the world’s largest “receiving” country, accept-
ing almost two-thirds of all intercountry adopted children.6 
From World War II to 2004, the number of intercountry 
adoptions in the United States increased through a series of 
waves produced by foreign crises and changes in social condi-
tions.7 From the first intercountry adoptions in 1944, the num-
ber of annual adoptions rose to 22,990 in 2004.8 However, after 
2004, the number of intercountry adoptions rapidly declined by 
over half in the following six years, dropping to 11,059 in 2010.9 
Intercountry adoptions declined as a result of increased adop-
tion costs, additional regulations, and the closing of several 
“sending” countries.10 
The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees 
(“UNHCR”) collects data from fifty-eight countries with state-
less populations.11 The data UNHCR collects is not exhaustive, 
as several countries with stateless populations are not identi-
fied by UNHCR, including China and the Dominican Repub-
lic.12 The following chart identifies the national population and 
number of adoptions in the United States from fifty-eight coun-
tries. Data from 2009 was selected for purposes of this Article 
                                                                                                             
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/08/04/world/americas/04adoption.html (describ-
ing how the earthquake in Haiti prompted an influx of international adop-
tions to the United States). 
 6. PETER SELMAN, THE MOVEMENT OF CHILDREN FOR INTERCOUNTRY 
ADOPTION: A DEMOGRAPHIC PERSPECTIVE 7 (2001), www.archive-
iussp.org/Brazil2001/s20/S27_P05_Selman.pdf. America is also a “sending” 
country, although this is a relatively uncommon occurrence. Anne-Marie 
O’Neill, Why Are American Babies Being Adopted Abroad?, PEOPLE MAG. 
(June 6, 2005), http:// 
www.people.com/people/archive/article/0,,20147746,00.html. 
 7. Carlson, supra note 4, at 318. 
 8. See also Elizabeth Bartholet, International Adoption: A Way Forward, 
55 N.Y. L. SCH. L. REV. 687, 688 (2010–2011) [hereinafter Bartholet, A Way 
Forward]. 
 9. See id. 
 10. See Kathryn Joyce, The Evangelical Adoption Crusade, NATION (Apr. 
21, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/160096/evangelical-adoption-
crusade#. Countries such as Guatemala and China have heavily restricted 
international adoption, which has impacted the number of adoptions into 
America. Also, nine other smaller countries have completely closed off adop-
tion as a result of ethical scandals and child trafficking concerns, while doz-
ens of other countries have placed heavy restrictions on international adop-
tions. Id. 
 11. Stateless People, supra note 1. 
 12. Id. 
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because it provides the most recent data on orphans. Adoptions 
to the United States from countries with stateless populations 
represent approximately 36% of all intercountry adoptions re-
ceived by the United States. Additionally, twenty-eight of fifty-
eight countries, or 48% of countries listed, allow the United 
States to receive children through intercountry adoption. Con-
sequently, stateless persons are not beyond the reach of inter-
country adoption. Significant populations of stateless persons 
live in countries with a functioning framework for adoption 
with the United States. 
 
Exhibit A. All Adoptions to the United States from Countries 
with Stateless Populations 
 
Countries with stateless  
populations 2009 population 
Adoptions to U.S. in 
2009 
Austria 8,210,281 0 
Azerbaijan 8,238,672 0 
Belarus 9,648,533 0 
Belgium 10,414,336 0 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,613,414 3 
Burma (Myanmar) 48,137,741 0 
Colombia 45,644,023 238 
Croatia 4,489,409 0 
Denmark 5,500,510 0 
Egypt 83,082,869 2 
Estonia 1,299,371 9 
Finland 5,250,275 0 
France 64,057,792 0 
Georgia 4,615,807 0 
Germany 82,329,758 0 
Greece 10,737,428 2 
Hungary 9,905,596 7 
Iceland 306,694 0 
Iraq 28,945,657 0 
Italy 58,126,212 2 
Japan 127,078,679 43 
Kazakhstan 15,399,437 296 
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Countries with stateless  
populations 2009 population 
Adoptions to U.S. in 
2009 
Kenya 39,002,772 21 
Kuwait 2,691,158 0 
Kyrgyzstan 5,431,747 19 
Latvia 2,231,503 28 
Liechtenstein 34,761 0 
Lithuania 3,555,179 22 
Luxembourg 491,775 0 
Macedonia 2,066,718 1 
Malaysia 25,715,819 1 
Moldova 4,320,748 5 
Mongolia 3,041,142 8 
Montenegro 672,180 0 
Nepal 28,563,377 6 
Netherlands 16,715,999 0 
Norway 4,660,539 0 
Panama 3,360,474 0 
Poland 38,482,919 50 
Portugal 10,707,924 0 
Qatar 833,285 0 
Romania 22,215,421 5 
Russian Federation 140,041,247 1,588 
Saudi Arabia 28,686,633 0 
Serbia 7,379,339 4 
Slovakia 5,463,046 0 
South Korea 48,508,972 1,079 
Spain 40,525,002 0 
Sweden 9,059,651 0 
Switzerland 7,604,467 0 
Syrian Arab Republic 20,178,485 0 
Tajikistan 7,349,145 0 
Thailand 65,905,410 58 
Turkey 76,805,524 1 
Turkmenistan 4,884,887 0 
Ukraine 45,700,395 607 
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Countries with stateless  
populations 2009 population 
Adoptions to U.S. in 
2009 
United Kingdom 61,113,205 3 
Vietnam 86,967,524 481 
Total Adoptions  4,589 
 
A. Global Parties and Treaties 
Several treaties and intermediary bodies govern or affect the 
intercountry adoption process. The Convention on the Rights of 
the Child (“CRC”), in particular, sets out the civil, political, 
economic, social, health, and cultural rights of children.13 The 
CRC defines a child as any human being under the age of 
eighteen, unless the age of majority is attained earlier under a 
state’s own domestic legislation.14 The CRC is considered “a 
universally agreed set of non-negotiable standards and obliga-
tions . . . that should be respected by governments.”15 It is one 
                                                                                                             
 13. United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 21, Nov. 20, 
1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 3 (entered into force Sept. 2, 1990) [hereinafter CRC]. 
 14. Id. 
 15. UNICEF, Convention on the Rights of the Child (Feb. 18, 2014), 
http://www.unicef.org/crc/index_30160.html. The United States is the only 
member of the United Nations that did not ratify the CRC. See Elizabeth 
Bartholet, International Adoption: Thoughts on the Human Rights Issues, 13 
BUFF. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 151 (2007) [hereinafter Bartholet, Human Rights]; 
CRC, supra note 13. Article 21 of the CRC states: 
Parties that recognize and/or permit the system of adoption shall en-
sure that the best interests of the child shall be the paramount con-
sideration and they shall: 
(a) Ensure that the adoption of a child is authorized only by 
competent authorities who determine, in accordance with 
applicable law and procedures and on the basis of all perti-
nent and reliable information, that the adoption is permis-
sible in view of the child’s status concerning parents, rela-
tives and legal guardians and that, if required, the persons 
concerned have given their informed consent to the adoption 
on the basis of such counseling as may be necessary; 
(b) Recognize that intercountry adoption may be considered 
as an alternative means of the child’s care, if the child can-
not be placed in a foster or an adoptive family or cannot in 
any suitable manner be cared for in the child’s country of 
origin; 
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of the most widely ratified conventions; however, the United 
States is not a signatory.16 
The CRC addresses intercountry adoption in ways that many 
view as anti-adoption.17 Under the auspices of UNHCR,18 the 
CRC follows the “principal of solidarity,” which states that an 
orphan should be placed in in-country foster care or any other 
“suitable” form of orphan care before being considered for per-
manent intercountry adoption placement.19 While the CRC 
“fails to proscribe specific procedures that should be followed” 
in international adoption, it clearly places intercountry adop-
                                                                                                             
(c) Ensure that the child concerned by intercountry adoption 
enjoys safeguards and standards equivalent to those exist-
ing in the case of national adoption; 
(d) Take all appropriate measures to ensure that, in inter-
country adoption, the placement does not result in improper 
financial gain for those involved in it; 
(e) Promote, where appropriate, the objectives of the present 
article by concluding bilateral or multilateral arrangements 
or agreements, and endeavor, within this framework, to en-
sure that the placement of the child in another country is 
carried out by competent authorities or organs. 
Id. 
 16. Convention on the Rights of the Child, UNITED NATIONS TREATY 
COLLECTION, 
https://treaties.un.org/pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-
11&chapter=4&lang=en (last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 17. See, e.g., Laura McKinney, International Adoption and the Hague Con-
vention: Does Implementation of the Convention Protect the Best Interests of 
Children?, 6 WHITTIER J. CHILD & FAM. ADVOC. 361, 379 (2007) (discussing 
the CRC’s preference for institutionalization over out-of-country adoption); 
see also Lisa M. Katz, Comment: A Modest Proposal? The Convention on Pro-
tection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, 9 
EMORY INT’L L. REV. 283, 304 (1995); Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 
15, at 154–55 (noting UNICEF’s “generally negative attitude to international 
adoption” and noting that it “only grudgingly approves of such adoption, and 
places it low on the hierarchy of alternatives for children in need”); UNICEF 
Says ‘No’ to Inter-country Adoption, FREE LIBRARY (Jan. 5, 2005), 
http://www.thefreelibrary.com/UNICEF+Says+’No’+to+Inter-
Country+Adoption.-a0126700872 (noting UNICEF policy that intercountry 
adoption should be considered as a “last resort” to tsunami victims). 
 18. Monitoring Human Rights, COMM. ON THE RIGHTS OF THE CHILD (Oct. 8, 
2013), http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/crc/index.htm. 
 19. CRC, supra note 13; see also Richard Carlson, Seeking the Better Inter-
ests of Children with a New International Law of Adoption, 55 N.Y.L. SCH. L. 
REV. 733, 736–37 (2010) (discussing the CRC). 
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tion at the bottom of the hierarchy of possible orphan care solu-
tions.20 
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Co-
operation in Respect of Intercountry Adoption (“Hague Adop-
tion Convention”) sets out to provide universal guidelines and 
standards for intercountry adoption, seeking to ensure adop-
tions are made in the best interests of the child and to prevent 
the child from “abduction . . . sale . . . [or] traffic[king].”21 Sig-
natories to the Hague Adoption Convention, including the 
United States, agree to meet several requirements: establish-
ing a “Central Authority” to serve as the country’s primary con-
tact in adoption processes; satisfying several checks before 
deeming a child eligible for adoption, including verifying the 
propriety of the adoption under the laws of both countries and 
making a reasonable effort to first facilitate a domestic adop-
tion; and agreeing to use only certified adoption agencies.22 
Initially, the Hague Adoption Convention planned to facili-
tate intercountry adoption and expedite placement. However, 
the mandate of the convention changed to a “more single-
                                                                                                             
 20. Elizabeth Long, Where Are They Coming from, Where Are They Going: 
Demanding Accountability in International Adoption, 18 CARDOZO J.L. & 
GENDER 827, 834 (2012). 
 21. U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, Understanding the Hague Convention, 
INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION, 
http://adoption.state.gov/hague_convention/overview.php (last visited Feb. 17, 
2012) [hereinafter Understanding the Hague Convention] (summarizing the 
facts and process set forth by the Hague Adoption Convention for interna-
tional adoption in the United States). The stated goals of the Hague Adoption 
Convention are: 
a)  to establish safeguards to ensure that intercountry adoptions 
take place in the best interests of the child and with respect for his 
or her fundamental rights as recognised in international law; 
b)  to establish a system of co-operation amongst Contracting States 
to ensure that those safeguards are respected and thereby prevent 
the abduction, the sale of, or traffic in children; 
c)  to secure the recognition in Contracting States of adoptions made 
in accordance with the Convention. 
The Hague Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption art. 1, May 29, 1993, 1870 U.N.T.S. 167, 183 [here-
inafter Hague Adoption Convention]. 
 22. Understanding the Hague Convention, supra note 21; see also Hague 
Adoption Convention, supra note 21. 
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minded[] focus[] on preventing adoption abuses.”23 Generally, 
the Hague Adoption Convention is viewed by scholars and ad-
vocates as more adoption-friendly than the CRC. 
The preamble of the Hague Adoption Convention states that 
“intercountry adoption may offer the advantage of a permanent 
family to a child for whom a suitable family cannot be found in 
his or her State of origin.”24 Put differently, the Hague Adop-
tion Convention prioritizes intercountry adoption over in-
country foster care or institutions.25 These two international 
laws significantly impact the way intercountry adoptions are 
handled throughout the world.26 
1. Government Legislation 
Domestic leaders around the world take different views on 
adoption, with some leaders staunchly supporting intercountry 
adoptions27 and others foreboding it as a human rights viola-
tion.28 Nations prohibiting adoption may do so for religious rea-
                                                                                                             
 23. See Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 15, at 154. 
 24. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21, pmbl. 
 25. See Richard Carlson, An Analysis of the Hague Conference on Inter-
country Adoption, 30 TULSA L.J. 243, 255–65 (1994); see also Elizabeth Bar-
tholet & David Smolin, The Debate, in INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION: POLICIES, 
PRACTICES, AND OUTCOMES 371, 373, (2012), available at 
http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/bartholet/The_Debate_1_13_2012.pdf. 
The Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) and the Hague 
Convention on Intercountry Adoption (Hague Convention or HCIA) 
both defer to state sovereignty, leaving nation states free to ban in-
ternational adoption altogether regardless of whether they can pro-
vide children with nurturing homes in the absence of such adoption. 
Both provide that if countries choose to allow international adoption, 
they should exercise a preference for placing children in-country. 
Id. 
 26. Americans seeking to adopt in countries that have not signed the 
Hague Adoption Convention may do so under the less stringent Orphan 
Adoption Process. See Long, supra note 20. While permissible under U.S. law, 
the Orphan Adoption Process provides fewer safeguards, particularly for 
adoptive parents. Id. 
 27. U.S. Senator Mary Landrieu is considered to be a powerful advocate 
for intercountry adoption. See, e.g., Sen. Mary Landrieu Helps Adoption 
Standoff, MARY LANDRIEU: U.S. SENATOR FOR LA. (Apr. 11, 2012), 
http://www.landrieu.senate.gov/?p=news&id=3343. 
 28. British politician Baroness Emma Nicholson fights hard against inter-
national adoption and views any orphan leaving his country for another as a 
failure by the orphan’s nation. See, e.g., Emma Nicholson, Red Light on Hu-
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sons, as in Islamic countries, or for political reasons. Those who 
ban adoption for political reasons, including Romania, view in-
tercountry adoption as a shameful failure by the country to 
care for its own children and, perhaps, such an implicit admis-
sion would invite further scrutiny into child welfare.29 
2. Sending Countries 
Legislators in sending countries have a different set of con-
cerns than legislators in receiving countries. Legislators in 
sending countries must determine where orphans in the coun-
try may be sent30 and set requirements for the type of people 
who are qualified to adopt.31 When making decisions regarding 
intercountry adoption, these policy makers are influenced by 
internal pressure such as nationalism and fear of being seen as 
failing to take care of “their own” orphans. Policy makers also 
face external pressures from efforts by the United Nations 
Children’s Fund (“UNICEF”) and other human rights organiza-
tion that advocate for tougher adoption regulations.32 
In countries where intercountry adoption is permitted, the 
evolution of the legislative process often follows a similar pat-
tern. First, adoptions are only lightly regulated. Second, re-
ports of abusive practices surface. Third, political outrage 
grows over the abusive practices and citizens call for reform 
resulting in a “temporary” shut down of the program. Finally, 
intercountry adoption programs re-open, but with heavy re-
                                                                                                             
man Traffic, GUARDIAN (July 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2004/jul/01/adoptionandfostering.europe
anunion; Romania Bans International Adoption, CNN.COM/WORLD (June 22, 
2001), available at 
http://edition.cnn.com/2001/WORLD/europe/06/22/romania.adoption/.  
 29. See Andrew Bainham, International Adoption from Romania—Why the 
Moratorium Should Not Be Ended, 15 CHILD & FAM. L.Q. 223, 227–28 (2003). 
 30. For a full discussion on the role of domestic policy makers, see Bar-
tholet, Human Rights, supra note 15, at 166–70. 
 31. For example, China recently determined that people who are single or 
obese may not adopt Chinese orphans. See CHINA: Intercountry Adoption, 
BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/country_specific_info.php?coun
try-select=china (last visited Dec. 19, 2013); see also Pam Belluck & Jim 
Yardley, China Tightens Adoption Rules for Foreigners, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 20, 
2006), http://www.nytimes.com/2006/12/20/us/20adopt.html. 
 32. Bartholet, Human Rights, supra note 15, at 167. 
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strictions.33 The response is frequently reactionary, with abus-
es caused by a few affecting the majority and making a well-
intended process more difficult, thus deterring would-be fami-
lies from adopting. 
3. Receiving Countries 
Policy makers in receiving countries also affect adoption by 
regulating adoptions of children from other countries. For ex-
ample, in the United States, federal lawmakers impacted in-
ternational adoption by enacting the Intercountry Adoption Act 
(the “Act”).34 The Act served as the United States’ implementa-
tion of the Hague Adoption Convention’s ideals and mecha-
nisms.35 The Act governs any adoption between the United 
States and another country that is a signatory to the Hague 
Adoption Convention.36 Additionally, it preempts any state law 
that is not in compliance with the Hague Adoption Convention 
and also establishes its own provisions that go beyond those 
required under the Hague Adoption Convention.37 Finally, the 
Act names the U.S. State Department as the “Central Authori-
ty” for intercountry adoptions involving the United States.38 
a. The U.S. State Department 
Under the authority of the Act, the State Department worked 
to build a regulatory framework to advance the ideals of both 
the Hague Adoption Convention and the Intercountry Adoption 
                                                                                                             
 33. Id. (discussing China, Guatemala, and Russia following this pattern). 
 34. See generally 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2006). 
 35. Adoption Process: Intercountry Adoption, BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, http://adoption.state.gov/adoption_process.php 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 36. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2006). 
 37. Long, supra note 20, at 847. 
The IAA is an American-drafted piece of legislation that serves to aid 
the implementation of the Hague Adoption Convention in the United 
States. Confusing the IAA with the Convention results in misguided 
criticism of the statute based on a separate piece of legislation, ra-
ther than on the international statute’s requirements. 
Id. 
 38. 42 U.S.C. §§ 14901–14954 (2006). 
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Act.39 Under these regulations, Americans seeking to adopt a 
child must apply to the State Department, which then prepares 
a file on the potential adoptive parents’ “identity, eligibility and 
suitability to adopt, background, family and medical history, 
social environment, reasons for adoption, ability to undertake 
intercountry adoption, as well as the characteristics of the chil-
dren for whom they would be qualified to care.”40 
Additionally, the State Department is charged with certifying 
adoption agencies under the Hague Adoption Convention.41 The 
stringent requirements of the Hague Adoption Convention, In-
tercountry Adoption Act, and the State Departments’ own regu-
lations have led to as many as 15% of pre-Hague American 
adoption agencies shutting down.42 Moreover, the State De-
partment monitors the adoption practices of other countries, 
and in some cases, prohibits Americans from adopting from 
countries where abusive practices are suspected.43 
The Hague Adoption Convention presents challenges and op-
portunities for the adoption of stateless children. On the one 
hand, the convention provides a fluid process between the two 
countries that ratified the document.44 Some countries with 
stateless populations have signed and ratified the convention, 
and others practice the convention without formally agreeing to 
it.45 However, several countries with stateless populations are 
not signatories. Even if a country is not a signatory, adoptions 
can still take place between a Hague ratifying country and a 
                                                                                                             
 39. Trish Maskew, The Failure of Promise: The U.S. Regulations on Inter-
country Adoption under the Hague Convention, 60 ADMIN. L. REV. 487, 494 
(2008). 
 40. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21, art. 15(1). 
 41. See Long, supra note 20, at 845. Due to the stringent requirements of 
the Hague Adoption Convention, the U.S. State Department initially had a 
heavy backlog of over 300 agency applications. Id. at 846. 
 42. Advocacy groups have claimed that over 15% of American adoption 
agencies closed down because they could not meet the requirements of certifi-
cation by the State Department. Id. at 846 n.192; see also Dan Frosch, New 
Rules and Economy Strain Adoption Agencies, N.Y. TIMES (May 11, 2008), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/05/11/us/11adopt.html. 
 43. See Alerts and Notices: Intercountry Adoptions, BUREAU OF CONSULAR 
AFFAIRS, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, 
http://adoption.state.gov/country_information/alerts_notices.php (last visited 
Feb. 17, 2012) (listing countries with adoption notices or alerts). 
 44. See generally Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21. 
 45. Id. 
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non-convention country.46 On the other hand, the Hague Adop-
tion Convention poses some obstacles, particularly when both 
the sending and receiving countries have signed and ratified 
the convention. For instance, the Hague Adoption Convention 
imposes stricter requirements for documentation and proof 
that the child is in fact an orphan.47 Such documents may be 
nonexistent in the case of stateless children, and proof that the 
child is an orphan may rely in part on circumstantial evi-
dence.48 As a result, the intercountry adoption of stateless chil-
dren may prove easier from countries that are not signatories 
to the Hague Adoption Convention because they do not have an 
additional bureaucratic step. The following chart lists the 
Hague Adoption Convention status of countries with docu-
mented stateless populations. 
 
Exhibit B. Countries with Stateless Populations and Hague 
Status 
 
Countries with 
stateless  
populations 
Hague 
signature 
Hague 
ratification 
Hague 
acceptance 
Entry into 
force 
Non- 
Convention 
Austria x     
Azerbaijan — — x x — 
Belarus x x — x — 
Belgium x x — x — 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina — x — x — 
Burma  
(Myanmar) — — — — x 
Colombia x x — x — 
Croatia — — — — x 
Denmark x x — x — 
Egypt — — — — x 
Estonia — x — x — 
Finland x x — x — 
France x x — x — 
Georgia — x — x — 
                                                                                                             
 46. Id. 
 47. See id. 
 48. Id. 
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Countries with 
stateless  
populations 
Hague 
signature 
Hague 
ratification 
Hague 
acceptance 
Entry into 
force 
Non- 
Convention 
Germany x x — x — 
Greece x x — x — 
Hungary x x — x — 
Iceland — — x x — 
Iraq — — — — x 
Italy x x — x — 
Japan — — — — x 
Kazakhstan — — x x — 
Kenya — — x x — 
Kuwait — — — — x 
Kyrgyzstan — — — — x 
Latvia x x — x — 
Liechtenstein — — x x — 
Lithuania — x — x — 
Luxembourg x x — x — 
Macedonia — — x x — 
Malaysia — — — — x 
Moldova — — x x — 
Mongolia — — x x — 
Montenegro — — — — x 
Nepal — — — — x 
Netherlands x x — x — 
Norway x x — x — 
Panama x x — x — 
Poland x x — x — 
Portugal x x — x — 
Qatar — — — — x 
Romania x x — x — 
Russian  
Federation x — — — x 
Saudi Arabia — — — — x 
Serbia — — — — x 
Slovakia x x — x — 
South Korea — — — — x 
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Countries with 
stateless  
populations 
Hague 
signature 
Hague 
ratification 
Hague 
acceptance 
Entry into 
force 
Non- 
Convention 
Spain — — — — x 
Sweden x x — x — 
Switzerland x x — x — 
Syrian Arab  
Republic — — — — x 
Tajikistan — — — — x 
Thailand x x — x — 
Turkey x x — x — 
Turkmenistan — — — — x 
Ukraine — — — — x 
United Kingdom x x — x — 
Viet Nam x x — x — 
Total Number  37 20 
 
b. Other Stakeholders 
UNICEF impacts the adoption discussion in two ways. First, 
UNICEF prepares estimates of both the number of orphans in 
the world and the frequency of adoption abuses.49 Second, 
UNICEF promotes an agenda of increased regulations and 
burdens on intercountry adoption.50 UNICEF has been working 
to combat statelessness by registering children in their country 
of birth or residence.51 Perhaps intercountry adoption would 
work against UNICEF’s goals as it would give nation-states 
denying citizenship an alternative—to pass the handling of the 
stateless child problem to another country. 
 
                                                                                                             
 49. To understand the relevance of this, see supra notes 15, 17 and accom-
panying text. 
 50. Long supra note 20 at 836–38. 
 51. Millions of Asian Children Living in Stateless Limbo, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_31593.html (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
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II. STATELESSNESS BACKGROUND 
A. Defining Statelessness 
Statelessness is a frequently overlooked global struggle af-
fecting an estimated 11–15 million individuals around the 
globe who lack citizenship.52 Citizenship is the key to the door 
of basic human rights, such as education, health care, employ-
ment, and equality.53 Without citizenship, it is difficult for 
stateless individuals to exercise these basic human rights. De-
spite the growing problem of statelessness and the severe vul-
nerability of those affected, the international response has been 
minimal.54 
                                                                                                             
 52. See Indira Goris, Julia Harrington & Sebastian Köhn, Statelessness: 
What It Is and Why It Matters, FORCED MIGRATION REV., Apr. 2009, at 4, 4, 
available at http://www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR32/04-06.pdf. As de-
scribed in an appeal for why statelessness matters, an article by Goris, Har-
rington, and Köhn quipped: 
For many of us, citizenship only really matters when we travel 
abroad, when the Olympic Games are on, or when we vote in nation-
al elections. We do not think about our citizenship on a daily basis. 
For others, citizenship is an ever-present issue, and often an obsta-
cle. Because recognition of nationality serves as a key to a host of 
other rights, such as education, health care, employment, and equal-
ity before the law, people without citizenship—those who are ‘state-
less’—are some of the most vulnerable in the world. 
Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. See Thawdar, Bleak Future for Burmese Stateless Children, IRRAWADDY 
(July 11, 2009), http://www2.irrawaddy.org/article.php?art_id=16310&page=1 
[hereinafter Bleak Future]. The Irrawaddy is a Southeast Asian newspaper 
based in Northern Thailand that reports on regional matters with an eye 
particularly toward political matters and current events in Burma (Myan-
mar). In the article Bleak Future for Burmese Stateless Children, the news-
paper reported on the migration of street children from Burma to Thailand. 
The Irrawaddy profiled the issue and its international response. 
“Shockingly little is being done to protect the basic rights of millions 
of stateless children around the world,” said Maureen Lynch of Ref-
ugees International’s Senior Advocate for Stateless Initiatives, and 
author of Futures Denied. 
“These children are stigmatized and blocked from such basic services 
as health care and education because a government won’t recognize 
them as citizens,” she said. 
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Statelessness is the condition of not possessing recognized 
citizenship in a state or nation.55 “People are stateless because 
they did not acquire a nationality at birth, their state of origin 
no longer exists, or no state will accept them as citizens.”56 
UNHCR estimated in 2009 that 12 million people worldwide 
are stateless—“they are not considered as nationals by any 
State under the operation of its law.”57 According to the State 
Department, data on statelessness is so limited that the inter-
national community does not even know if the numbers are 
growing or shrinking.58 
Statelessness is a condition caused by governments, rather 
than by the actions of individuals.59 Gaps in international law 
                                                                                                             
Lynch also said, “Although the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights states that everyone has the right to a nationality, these chil-
dren are forced into an underclass with little hope for the future 
through no fault of their own.” 
Id. 
 55. 4 GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL GUIDE TO CITIZENS’ RIGHTS 
AND RESPONSIBILITIES 128 (C. Neal Tate ed., 2006). 
 56. Id. 
 57. DIV. OF INT’L PROTECTION, UNHCR, UNHCR ACTION TO ADDRESS 
STATELESSNESS: A STRATEGY NOTE 4 (2010), 
http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/4b9e0c3d2.pdf [hereinafter UNHCR 
STRATEGY NOTE]; see also Goris et al., supra note 52, at 4 (“Estimates of the 
current number of stateless persons in the world range from 11 to 15 million. 
There is not only a lack of systematic attention given to collecting reliable 
statistics but also a lack of consensus on whom to include when counting 
stateless people.”); UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, http://www.unhcr.org 
(last visited Sept. 15, 2011). 
 58. See Samuel M. Witten & David J. Kramer, Imagine This: You Have No 
Country, No Country Will Claim You, U.S. DEP’T OF STATE OFFICIAL BLOG 
(Sept. 16, 2008, 8:30 AM), http://blogs.state.gov/stories/2008/09/16/imagine-
you-have-no-country-no-country-will-claim-you; see also BRAD K. BLITZ, 
REFUGEE STUDIES CTR., STATELESSNESS, PROTECTION AND EQUALITY 9 (2009), 
available at http://www.refworld.org/docid/4e5f3d572.html. 
Some of the most widely cited cases of statelessness include minority 
groups that have been formally excluded from the right to nationali-
ty such as the Rohingyas in Myanmar (+ 1 million), Pygmy Banyar-
wanda in the Democratic Republic of Congo (1.5 million), Biharis in 
Bangladesh (300,000), ethnic Ethiopians and Eritreans in the Horn 
of Africa (500,000), and other groups such as the Meskhetian Turks 
in Southern Russia (15,000). 
Id. 
 59. See BLITZ, supra note 58, at 1. 
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and the sovereignty of nation-states allow the phenomenon of 
statelessness not only to exist, but also to continue relatively 
unfettered. “International law traditionally affords states broad 
discretion to define the contours of, and delimit access to, citi-
zenship.”60 However, “[p]eople are vulnerable to statelessness 
when governments determine citizenship based on descent, 
race, ethnicity, or the whim of those in power.”61 The risk of al-
lowing individual states to determine citizenship independently 
is that those nations may define citizenship for the purpose of 
discriminating against particular classes of people.62 
People arrive at the condition of statelessness through one of 
two different measures: (1) “de jure statelessness,” or (2) “de 
facto statelessness.” 
1. De Jure Statelessness 
De jure statelessness occurs when there is no recognized 
state to which a person may claim nationality and citizenship;63 
for instance, when an individual’s state ceases to exist and 
there is no successor state.64 Under the purview of UNHCR, the 
de jure situation is recognized by both the 1954 Convention Re-
lating to the Status of Stateless Persons (“Status Convention”) 
and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness 
(“Statelessness Reduction Convention” or “1961 Convention”).65 
                                                                                                             
 60. James A. Goldston, Holes in the Rights Framework: Racial Discrimina-
tion, Citizenship, and the Rights of Noncitizens, 20 ETHICS & INT’L AFF. 321, 
323 (2006). 
 61. GOVERNMENTS OF THE WORLD: A GLOBAL GUIDE TO CITIZENS’ RIGHTS AND 
RESPONSIBILITIES, supra note 55, at 129. 
 62. See id. at 129–30. 
 63. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons, art. 1, 
Sept. 28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117, 136 (defining a stateless individual as “a 
person not considered as a national by any State under the operation of its 
law”). 
 64. De jure statelessness received pop culture attention through the 2004 
movie The Terminal, where Tom Hanks plays a man who, while in transit 
through the United States, learns that his home country’s government is 
overthrown and that the new government is not recognized by the United 
States. See THE TERMINAL (DreamWorks Pictures 2004). 
 65. Hugh Massey, UNHCR and De Facto Statelessness, in LEGAL AND 
PROTECTION POLICY RESEARCH SERIES (UNHCR No. 16 2010). Massey was 
Senior Legal Advisor to UNHCR. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57, at 
4. 
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2. De Facto Statelessness 
De facto statelessness occurs when a person possesses a le-
gally meritorious claim for citizenship, but is precluded from 
asserting it because of practical considerations such as cost, 
circumstances of civil disorder, or fear of persecution.66 In de 
facto situations, the state is often in existence, but the individ-
ual lacks protection of the laws by a mechanical failure of the 
state.67 In other words, de facto stateless people lack an effec-
tive nationality.68 De facto statelessness may even include 
those inside the state of their nationality. Categories of persons 
fitting into de facto statelessness are: (1) persons who do not 
enjoy the rights attached to their nationality; (2) persons who 
are unable to establish their nationality, or who are of unde-
termined nationality; (3) persons who, in the context of state 
succession, are attributed the nationality of a state other than 
the state of their habitual residence.69 
                                                                                                             
UNHCR’s responsibilities for stateless persons began with refugees 
who are stateless under paragraph 6(A) (II) of its Statute and article 
1(A) (2) of the 1951 Convention relating to the Status of Refugees 
(1951 Convention), both of which refer to stateless persons who meet 
the criteria of the refugee definition. UNHCR’s mandate responsibil-
ities concerning statelessness were expanded following the adoption 
of the 1954 Convention relating to the Status of Stateless Persons 
(1954 Convention), and the 1961 Convention on the Reduction of 
Statelessness (1961 Convention). General Assembly resolutions 3274 
(XXIV) and 31/36 designated UNHCR as the body mandated to ex-
amine the cases of persons who claim the benefit of the 1961 Con-
vention and to assist such persons in presenting their claims to the 
appropriate national authorities. 
Id. 
 66. See Massey, supra note 65, at ii. 
[T]he Office has never clearly defined what de facto statelessness is, 
nor what the legal and operational responses to de facto stateless-
ness should be. In this respect, it should be noted that whereas an 
international treaty regime has been developed for addressing prob-
lems of de jure statelessness—including most notably the 1954 and 
1961 Statelessness Conventions—there is no such legally binding re-
gime at the global level for de facto stateless persons who are not 
refugees. 
Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. at i. 
 69. Id. at iii. 
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In 2006, James A. Goldston described how nations were 
wielding citizenship as a political weapon.70 “Across broad 
swaths of the globe, the treatment of noncitizens—so-called 
foreigners and aliens, migrants, refugees, asylum seekers, 
stateless persons . . . is worsening precisely as states are in-
creasingly bestowing, denying, or retracting citizenship as a 
political weapon.”71 
This Article will address both forms of statelessness broadly, 
as both forms result in the stateless condition of orphans, alt-
hough de facto statelessness has received less recognition with-
in the international legal community.72 
In a previous article entitled “Stateless,” I argue for a global 
system of universal identification for stateless persons building 
upon the foundation of the Nansen Passport, which I will brief-
ly describe below.73 Extending this concept, “Adopting the 
Stateless” presents a natural use and additional purpose for 
universal identification for stateless persons. 
B. A Brief History of Statelessness 
In analyzing UNHCR policy, Hugh Massey, Senior Legal Ad-
visor to UNHCR, noted that “[i]t was not until after the Second 
World War that international action was taken to establish a 
protection regime specifically for stateless persons.”74 In the 
1920s, due to fallout from World War I, Europe found itself 
with an influx of refugees spread across the continent.75 The 
League of Nations established the Office international Nansen 
pour les réfugiés (Nansen International Office for Refugees) to 
oversee the refugee challenge.76 The League of Nations High 
Commissioner for Refugees (“HCR”) was established in 1921 
under the leadership of Fridtjof Nansen, a Norwegian explorer, 
                                                                                                             
 70. Id. 
 71. Goldston, supra note 60, at 322. Goldston estimates that “as many as 
175 million worldwide—are not citizens of the countries in which they re-
side.” Id. 
 72. De facto statelessness is not recognized by the 1954 Convention on the 
Prevention of Statelessness but it is covered by customary law and practices. 
 73. See generally Milbrandt, supra note 2. 
 74. Massey, supra note 65, at 1 (providing an elaborate history of post-
World War II conventions, treaties, and studies with respect to stateless-
ness). 
 75. Id. 
 76. Id. 
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scientist, and diplomat.77 This represented the first time that 
the existence of refugees was analyzed as an international is-
sue.78 The HCR crafted the “Nansen Passport” for refugees, 
which was designed to be the first legal document that func-
tioned to give refugees a legal existence and allow them to 
travel more freely than in the past.79 The League of Nations 
agreed to the establishment of Nansen Passports at the Geneva 
Conference on July 5, 1922.80 Nansen Passports were used dur-
ing the period between World Wars I and II, with approximate-
ly 450,000 passports issued, aiding those stateless individuals 
to immigrate to a country willing to accept them.81 
Nansen Passport documents were originally issued solely to 
refugees fleeing civil war in Russia, but were subsequently of-
fered to various other refugee communities, including Armeni-
                                                                                                             
 77. A Century of Nobel Peace Prize Laureates: Fridtjof Nansen, INDIANA 
UNIV. CTR. FOR THE STUDY OF GLOBAL CHANGE, http://archive.is/s3di0 (last 
visited Oct. 5, 2011). 
Fridtjof Nansen was a Norwegian explorer, humanitarian, and 
statesman. He led a number of scientific expeditions to Greenland 
and the Arctic Ocean between 1888 and 1896 and accepted a faculty 
position at the University of Oslo as a zoologist. Nansen was the 
Norwegian delegate to the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919, ad-
vocating the adoption of the Covenant of the League of Nations and 
recognition of the rights of small states. He served as the Norwegian 
delegate to the League of Nations from 1920 to 1930 and held a 
number of high commissionerships. In this capacity he oversaw the 
repatriation of Central Power prisoners of war from Russia (1920 to 
1922), developed the Nansen Passport for refugees in Eastern Eu-
rope and the Middle East (1921), supervised food shipments to fam-
ine-stricken Russia (1921-1922), monitored the exchange of Greek 
and Turkish refugees after the Turko-Greek War (1922), and 
planned for a national home for Armenian refugees in Syria and 
Lebanon (1925). Nansen received the Nobel Peace Prize in 1922 for 
his humanitarian work with refugees. He died on May 13, 1930 near 
Oslo. 
Id.; see also Laura Barnett, Global Governance and the Evolution of the In-
ternational Refugee Regime, 14 INT’L J. REFUGEE L. 238, 242 (2002). 
 78. Barnett, supra note 77. 
 79. See id. 
 80. Id.; see also League of Nations Passport, ENCYCLOPÆDIA BRITANNICA, 
available at http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/333862/League-of-
Nations-Passport (last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 81. Nansen Passport Donated to the Zohrab Center, ZOHRAB CTR., 
http://zohrabcenter.org/2010/08/20/nansen-passport-donated-to-the-zohrab-
center (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). 
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ans in 1924, and Turks, Assyrians, Syrians, Assyro-Chaldeans, 
and Kurds by 1928.82 No state was required to permit the entry 
or resettlement of refugees holding a Nansen Passport, but 
every state that was a member of the League of Nations agreed 
to recognize the documents as a valid form of identification.83 
Fifty-two governments ratified the original arrangement and 
issued Nansen Passports, but there was almost no defining 
unity as to the format and requirements of the various docu-
ments produced by these countries.84 As a result, the power and 
value of the document varied according to the host country as 
well as the time period.85 Often, these travel documents took 
the form of “nothing more than a sheet of paper (or . . . booklet) 
with printed categories to be filled in by the issuer,” and a 
space for the photograph and signature of the holder.86 This 
wide array of documents, which came under the umbrella of 
the Nansen Passport, could be seen as merely “a loose conver-
gence of policy, paper, and personal information.”87 UNHCR 
eventually assumed the role carried out by the Nansen Inter-
national Office for Refugees.88 
Although these documents served to facilitate cross-border 
travel for many refugees, the documents provided no guaran-
tees of protection from the state in which these individuals set-
tled.89 In effect, these individuals were granted increased free-
dom of movement through the Nansen Passport, but the Nan-
sen Passport did not assure the protection enjoyed by citizens 
or nationals of the state in which they settled, such as personal 
welfare, access to employment, protection against expulsion, 
                                                                                                             
 82. Esra Su, Turkey’s Asylum Dilemma and Process of Harmonization 15 
(Dec. 2008) (unpublished M.S. thesis, Middle East Technical University), 
available at http://etd.lib.metu.edu.tr/upload/12610257/index.pdf. 
 83. See generally Nansen Passport Donated to the Zohrab Center, supra 
note 81. 
 84. Nansen Passport, NYU DEP’T OF MEDIA, CULTURE, & COMMC’N—DEAD 
MEDIA ARCHIVE, 
http://cultureandcommunication.org/deadmedia/index.php/Nansen_Passport 
(last visited Dec. 20, 2013). 
 85. See id. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. 
 88. See id. 
 89. See Barnett, supra note 77, at 242–43. 
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and other protections and liberties traditionally preserved 
through the state.90 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights (the “Declara-
tion”) specifically enumerates statelessness as a matter of hu-
man rights.91 Article 15 of the Declaration, issued in December 
1948, affirms that: “(1) [e]veryone has the right to a nationality 
[and] (2) [n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his nationality 
nor denied the right to change his nationality.”92 In 1950, the 
United Nations created UNHCR whose responsibility toward 
stateless persons began in 1951 with those persons who quali-
fied as refugees.93 
The first significant step toward identifying statelessness 
took place at the 1954 Status Convention. UNHCR calls the 
1954 Status Convention the “cornerstone of the international 
protection regime for stateless persons.”94 According to 
UNHCR, the 1954 Status Convention defines the de jure state-
less person and establishes an internationally recognized sta-
tus for stateless persons.95 This newfound status extended spe-
cific rights to stateless persons, most notably, the issuance of 
limited identity and travel documents.96 
The next significant development was the 1961 Statelessness 
Reduction Convention.97 This convention focused on strategy 
for eliminating statelessness. The most significant achievement 
of the 1961 Convention was that it mandated signatory states 
to respond to statelessness and not arbitrarily deprive persons 
of citizenship. According to UNHCR: 
Specific obligations relating to prevention and reduction of 
statelessness are established under the 1961 Convention on 
the Reduction of Statelessness and in regional treaties. The 
1961 Convention requires that States establish safeguards in 
legislation to address statelessness occurring at birth or later 
                                                                                                             
 90. See id. 
 91. Universal Declaration of Human Rights [UDHR], G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, 
art. 15, U.N. Doc. A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948). 
 92. Id. 
 93. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57; see also supra note 65 and 
accompanying text. 
 94. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57. 
 95. Id. 
 96. Id. 
 97. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, Aug. 30, 1961, 989 
U.N.T.S. 175. 
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in life. The Convention also establishes obligations for States 
in the event of State succession.98 
The 1961 Convention became enforceable on December 13, 
1975.99 By 2007, however, only thirty-two countries had acced-
ed to it.100 The weak response from the international communi-
ty damaged the intended strength of the convention. 
Beyond the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and 
statelessness conventions, tangential conventions addressing 
susceptible classes of people have identified statelessness as an 
issue or recognized the right to nationality.101 The 1959 United 
Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child claims in Princi-
ple 3 that “[t]he child shall be entitled from his birth to a name 
and a nationality.”102 
Massey summarizes the current UNHCR position on state-
lessness as follows: 
UNHCR’s mandate has since been progressively developed to 
the point where it . . . lists a number of measures to be taken 
by UNHCR, States and other actors with respect to: 
• The identification of “stateless persons and individ-
uals with undetermined nationality”; 
• The protection of “stateless persons”; and 
• The prevention and reduction of “statelessness.”103 
                                                                                                             
 98. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57. 
 99. See Convention on the Reduction of Statelessness, supra note 97. 
 100. See Convention Relating to the Status of Stateless Persons art. 1, Sept. 
28, 1954, 360 U.N.T.S. 117. 
 101. International instruments include: UDHR, supra note 91; Internation-
al Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171; 
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimi-
nation art. 1, opened for signature Mar. 7, 1966, S. Exec. Doc. C, 95-2 (1978), 
660 U.N.T.S. 195; Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion against Women art. 9, opened for signature Mar. 1, 1980, 1249 U.N.T.S. 
13; CRC, supra note 13; International Convention on the Protection of the 
Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, opened for 
signature Dec. 18, 1990, 2220 U.N.T.S. 3; and the United Nations Convention 
on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, G.A. Res. 61/611, Annex I, U.N. 
Doc. A/RES/61/611 (Dec. 13, 2006). 
 102. United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child, G.A. Res. 1386 
(XIV), U.N. GAOR, 14th Sess., Supp. No. 16 (Vol. I), U.N. Doc. A/4354 (Vol. I) 
(Nov. 20, 1959). 
 103. Massey, supra note 65, at ii. 
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C. The Global Stateless Population 
The exact global population of stateless persons is unknown. 
Estimates in 2010 by UNHCR put the stateless population at 
approximately 12 million.104 Data aggregated by UNHCR esti-
mates a 2009 population of nearly 6.5 million stateless per-
sons.105 The following chart identifies the countries where 
UNHCR has recorded stateless populations, along with the es-
timated number of stateless persons therein. It also presents 
the size of these stateless populations as a percentage of its na-
tional population. 
This chart may represent as little as half of the global state-
less population. Countries with high populations of stateless 
persons, such as China and the Dominican Republic, are not 
included in UNHCR’s 2009 data. 
 
Exhibit C. Stateless Persons as a Percentage of National Pop-
ulation 
 
Stateless populations  
in 2009106 
2009 
population107 
Stateless  
persons108 
Percent 
stateless 
Austria 8,210,281 523 0.006 
Azerbaijan 8,238,672 2,078 0.025 
Belarus 9,648,533 7,799 0.081 
Belgium 10,414,336 637 0.006 
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4,613,414 9,688 0.210 
Burma (Myanmar) 48,137,741 723,571 1.503 
Colombia 45,644,023 11 0.000 
Croatia 4,489,409 237 0.005 
                                                                                                             
 104. UNHCR STRATEGY NOTE, supra note 57, at 4; see also Goris et al., su-
pra note 52, at 4; see also UNHCR: THE UN REFUGEE AGENCY, 
http://www.unhcr.org (last visited Sept. 15, 2011). 
 105. HUMANITARIAN INFORMATION UNIT, STATELESSNESS: A GLOBAL 
CHALLENGE (Aug. 26, 2010), 
http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/181264.pdf. 
 106. UNHCR POPULATION STATISTICS REFERENCE DATABASE, 
http://popstats.unhcr.org/ (last visited Oct. 8, 2013). 
 107. All country populations are from the CIA World Factbook. The World 
Factbook, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, 
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook (last visited Oct. 
8, 2013). 
 108. UNHCR POPULATION STATISTICS REFERENCE DATABASE, supra note 106. 
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Stateless populations  
in 2009106 
2009 
population107 
Stateless  
persons108 
Percent 
stateless 
Denmark 5,500,510 3,263 0.059 
Egypt 83,082,869 64 0.000 
Estonia 1,299,371 104,813 8.066 
Finland 5,250,275 2,407 0.046 
France 64,057,792 1,078 0.002 
Georgia 4,615,807 1,677 0.036 
Germany 82,329,758 8,226 0.010 
Greece 10,737,428 260 0.002 
Hungary 9,905,596 49 0.000 
Iceland 306,694 133 0.043 
Iraq 28,945,657 230,000 0.795 
Italy 58,126,212 793 0.001 
Japan 127,078,679 1,525 0.001 
Kazakhstan 15,399,437 7,649 0.050 
Kenya 39,002,772 100,000 0.256 
Kuwait 2,691,158 93,000 3.456 
Kyrgyzstan 5,431,747 24,615 0.453 
Latvia 2,231,503 344,263 15.427 
Liechtenstein 34,761 6 0.017 
Lithuania 3,555,179 3,902 0.110 
Luxembourg 491,775 177 0.036 
Macedonia  2,066,718  1,911 0.092 
Malaysia 25,715,819 40,001 0.156 
Moldova 4,320,748 2,014 0.047 
Mongolia 3,041,142 373 0.012 
Montenegro 672,180 1,500 0.223 
Nepal 28,563,377 800,000 2.801 
Netherlands 16,715,999 5,034 0.030 
Norway 4,660,539 2,860 0.061 
Panama 3,360,474 1 0.000 
Poland 38,482,919 865 0.002 
Portugal 10,707,924 31 0.000 
Qatar 833,285 1,200 0.144 
Romania 22,215,421 306 0.001 
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Stateless populations  
in 2009106 
2009 
population107 
Stateless  
persons108 
Percent 
stateless 
Russian Federation 140,041,247 50,000 0.036 
Saudi Arabia 28,686,633 70,000 0.244 
Serbia 7,379,339 16,700 0.226 
Slovakia 5,463,046 911 0.017 
South Korea 48,508,972 103 0.000 
Spain 40,525,002 28 0.000 
Sweden 9,059,651 7,758 0.086 
Switzerland 7,604,467 67 0.001 
Syrian Arab Republic 20,178,485 300,000 1.487 
Tajikistan 7,349,145 2,626 0.036 
Thailand 65,905,410         3,500,000 5.311 
Turkey 76,805,524 2,739 0.004 
Turkmenistan 4,884,887 12,000 0.246 
Ukraine 45,700,395 56,500 0.124 
United Kingdom 61,113,205 205 0.000 
Viet Nam 86,967,524 7,200 0.008 
Total Stateless 6,555,377    
 
The small number of stateless persons as a percentage of na-
tional population suggests why statelessness is frequently over-
looked. Stateless persons regularly make up tenths, hun-
dredths, and thousandths of a percent of the population of the 
countries in which they reside. For example, while stateless-
ness affects only eight one-thousandths of a percent in Vi-
etnam, it afflicts more than 7,000 individuals in the country. 
Although the percentages per country are small, the total 
stateless population rises to over 6.5 million as an internation-
al group. 
D. Challenges for Adopting the Stateless 
A primary challenge for the intercountry adoption of stateless 
persons under the Hague Adoption Convention is that the con-
vention requires a sending country.109 Technically, stateless 
persons with no citizenship would have no formal sending 
country. 
                                                                                                             
 109. Hague Adoption Convention, supra note 21. 
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Receiving states would need to rely on the “host” state, most 
likely the country where the stateless person is residing. In 
many cases of statelessness, this is improbable or impossible. 
First, the host country may be adverse to the group of stateless 
persons (for instance, in Thailand where statelessness is a mat-
ter of illegal immigration).110 Alternatively, the country may be 
logistically incapable of addressing stateless persons in cases of 
de jure statelessness caused by ongoing wars or of de facto 
statelessness in under-resourced countries.111 Understandably, 
host countries might not want to become involved in the adop-
tion of stateless persons for reasons such as the added expense 
of administering an adoption facility. 
It will take special legislation outside of the Hague Adoption 
Convention to accommodate this process. Such legislation 
would expand on the Intercountry Adoption Act and give the 
State Department more power to receive children for adoption. 
Specific legislation has already been proposed to assist state-
less North Korean children, which will be addressed and ana-
lyzed in the following section. 
III. THE NORTH KOREAN DILEMMA 
Children of defecting North Korean mothers currently face a 
statelessness dilemma.112 Many of these women leave North 
Korea for China, which is problematic because China does not 
legally recognize these women as refugees.113 These mothers 
frequently give birth to children while in China.114 The fathers 
are often Chinese men who either developed a relationship 
with the North Korean mother, or fathered a child with a wom-
an through the North Korean sex industry.115 The child conse-
                                                                                                             
 110. Bleak Future, supra note 54. 
 111. Generally, if a nation does not have enough resources to care for its 
own citizens, it does not prioritize stateless persons residing within its bor-
ders. 
 112. Estimates of North Korean stateless children are around 20,000, but 
an accurate number is hard to estimate. Madison Park, U.S. Law Aimed at 
Helping North Korean Orphans, CNN (May 13, 2013), 
http://www.cnn.com/2013/05/13/us/north-korea-adoption/. 
 113. Kimberly Hyo-Jung Campbell, De Facto Statelessness Places Adoption 
on the Table for Children of N. Korean Women in China, HANKYOREH (June 
18, 2010), http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/english_edition/e_national/426317.html. 
 114. See id. 
 115. Id. 
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quently becomes stateless when the child’s mother is deported 
from China or dies. 
The children born from stateless North Korean mothers are 
legally entitled to obtain Chinese citizenship, but face major 
obstacles and practical challenges in doing so. In order to ob-
tain Chinese citizenship, a child must receive hukou, a family 
registry certificate.116 To receive hukou “the Chinese father 
must submit legal proof including testimonies from witnesses 
that his North Korean wife has been arrested and repatriated 
back to North Korea. This is a requirement because the mother 
may not be listed on the hukou due to her status as an illegal 
migrant.”117 
The difficulties in obtaining proof, including witness testimo-
ny, are significant hurdles for the Chinese father.118 Added to 
these challenges, Chinese men are reluctant to register their 
children because of the one-child policy.119 The stigma and po-
tential legal obstacles associated with his wife’s illegal status 
further disincline Chinese men toward registration.120 
These children meet the requirements for de facto stateless-
ness under category two: “Persons who are unable to establish 
their nationality, or who are of undetermined nationality.”121 
The children are unable to establish their nationality in China 
and are practically prevented from returning to North Korea 
and establishing their nationality there.122 
North Korea is by no means the only example of de facto 
statelessness or the only location where intercountry adoption 
may provide a solution. An estimated one million stateless 
children live along the Thai Burma border, and the countries 
have been unable to find a workable solution.123 
IV. ADOPTION AND STATELESSNESS 
The Hague Adoption Convention poses some hurdles for in-
tercountry adoption. While these hurdles are intended to pro-
tect the child, they also restrict the convention in ways that 
                                                                                                             
 116. Id. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. See id. 
 120. Id. 
 121. See Massey, supra note 65, at iii. 
 122. See id. 
 123. Bleak Future, supra note 54. 
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prevent it from adapting or innovating to new global challeng-
es, such as statelessness. 
The first challenge for intercountry adoption will be to estab-
lish that the child is adoptable under Article 4. The following 
chart lists countries with stateless populations and identifies 
whether the Hague Adoption Convention has entered into force 
in the corresponding country, or whether it falls outside the 
arms of the Hague as a non-convention country. Correlating 
data from UNHCR on stateless populations and the Hague 
Conference on Private International Law shows that stateless 
populations live largely outside the jurisdiction of the Hague 
Adoption Convention.124 
In total, UNHCR tracks 3,477,101 stateless people. This fig-
ure is short of the global estimate of 12 million.125 However, 
correlating stateless data with contracting countries, 1,007,816 
stateless persons live within Hague contracting countries. A 
total of 2,469,285 live in non-contracting countries, or 71% of 
the known global population of stateless persons. 
 
Exhibit D. Countries with Stateless Populations Participating 
with the Hague Adoption Convention 
 
Stateless populations in 2009 Stateless  persons 
Entry into 
force 
Non-
convention 
Austria 523 x — 
Azerbaijan 2,078 x — 
Belarus 7,799 x — 
Belgium 637 x — 
Bosnia and  
Herzegovina 9,688 — x 
Burma (Myanmar) 723,571 — x 
Colombia 11 x — 
                                                                                                             
 124. Statistics on statelessness are maintained by UNHCR. Stateless People 
Figures, UNHCR, http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c26.html (the latest 
data available is from 2011). A current list of ratifications and signatories to 
the Hague Adoption Convention is maintained by The Hague. Status Table, 
HCCH, http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=69 
(last visited Feb. 22, 2014). 
 125. UNHCR’s count is much smaller than the global estimate. Presumably, 
the discrepancy is explained by countries underreporting, failing to report, or 
the challenges in identifying stateless populations. 
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Stateless populations in 2009 Stateless  persons 
Entry into 
force 
Non-
convention 
Croatia 237 — x 
Denmark 3,263 x — 
Egypt 64 — x 
Estonia 104,813 x — 
Finland 2,407 x — 
France 1,078 x — 
Georgia 1,677 x — 
Germany 8,226 x — 
Greece 260 x — 
Hungary 49 x — 
Iceland 133 x — 
Iraq 230,000 — x 
Italy 793 x — 
Japan 1,525 — x 
Kazakhstan 7,649 x — 
Kenya 100,000 x — 
Kuwait 93,000 — x 
Kyrgyzstan 24,615 — x 
Latvia 344,263 x — 
Liechtenstein 6 x — 
Lithuania 3,902 x — 
Luxembourg 177 x — 
Macedonia 1,911 x — 
Malaysia 40,001 — x 
Moldova 2,014 x — 
Mongolia 373 x — 
Montenegro 1,500 — x 
Nepal 800,000 — x 
Netherlands 5,034 x — 
Norway 2,860 x — 
Panama 1 x — 
Poland 865 x — 
Portugal 31 x — 
Qatar 1,200 — x 
726 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 39:2 
Stateless populations in 2009 Stateless  persons 
Entry into 
force 
Non-
convention 
Romania 306 x — 
Russian Federation 50,000 — x 
Saudi Arabia 70,000 — x 
Serbia 16,700 — x 
Slovakia 911 x — 
South Korea 103 — x 
Spain 28 — x 
Sweden 7,758 x — 
Switzerland 67 x — 
Syrian Arab Republic 300,000 — x 
Tajikistan 2,626 — x 
Thailand 3,500,000 x — 
Turkey 2,739 x — 
Turkmenistan 12,000 — x 
Ukraine 56,500 — x 
United Kingdom 205 x — 
Viet Nam 7,200 x — 
Totals  6,555,377 37 21 
 
No statistically significant correlation exists between the size 
of the stateless population and the host nation’s lack of enter-
ing into the Hague Adoption Convention.126 Thus, it is not true 
that countries which allow stateless populations avoid or at-
tract the Hague Adoption Convention. 
After determining whether stateless populations exist in 
Hague Adoption Convention countries, it is necessary to esti-
mate the number of stateless children who might be orphaned. 
Since this data has not been collected, this Article will extrapo-
late an estimation of orphaned stateless children based upon 
regional estimates of orphaned children in the general popula-
tion. 
                                                                                                             
 126. Correlation coefficient of 0.004, or 0.4%. In other words, the size of the 
stateless population explains only 0.4% of why countries choose to enforce the 
Hague Adoption Convention. A p value of 0.973 suggests that the findings are 
not random. 
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An orphan is defined by UNICEF as a child who has lost one 
or more parents.127 For the purposes of adoption under the 
Hague Adoption Convention, and in the spirit of keeping the 
child united with his or her original parents, this Article rejects 
the notion that a stateless orphan put up for adoption would 
have lost only one parent. Accordingly, this chart estimates the 
percentage of children who have lost both parents; the estimate 
is based upon data gathered in various regions of the world in 
2009. Among the regions listed, on average, one in twelve chil-
dren has lost both parents. As shown in Exhibit E, estimated 
orphaned stateless children are not insignificant in number; 
there are millions in most countries identified in Exhibit E. 
 
Exhibit E. Orphaned Stateless Children 
 
Region 
Children who 
lost one or both 
parents due to 
any cause 
Children who 
lost both  
parents due to 
any cause 
Percent 
who lost 
both  
parents 
Africa, Sub-Saharan  56,100,000 9,100,000 16 
Eastern and Southern  
Africa 27,600,000 4,900,000 18 
West and Central Africa 26,400,000 4,100,000 16 
Middle East and North  
Africa 6,400,000 470,000 7 
Asia 71,400,000 5,300,000 7 
South Asia 41,000,000 3,400,000 8 
East Asia and Pacific 30,500,000 1,800,000 6 
Latin America and  
Caribbean 9,800,000 510,000 5 
CEE/CIS 7,300,000 410,000 6 
Developing countries 145,000,000 15,400,000 11 
World 153,000,000 17,800,000 12 
 
The following chart estimates the number of stateless or-
phans in the world. By identifying the countries with stateless 
populations, the chart multiplies tracked stateless populations 
by regional estimates of the number of orphaned children who 
have lost both parents. This figure estimates the number of 
                                                                                                             
 127. Press Centre: Orphans, UNICEF, 
http://www.unicef.org/media/media_45279.html (last updated May 25, 2012). 
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stateless orphans by country. Kenya, Burma, Nepal, and Thai-
land have the largest estimated population of orphaned state-
less children. 
 
Exhibit F. Estimated Number of Orphaned Stateless Children 
 
Stateless populations in 
2009 
Stateless 
persons 
Estimated state-
less (lost both 
parents) 
Estimated 
orphaned 
stateless 
Austria 523 11.6  0  
Azerbaijan 2,078 7.4  4  
Belarus 7,799 5.6  7  
Belgium 637 5.6  0  
Bosnia and Herzegovina 9,688 5.6  — 
Burma (Myanmar) 723,571 8.3  1,994  
Colombia 11 5.2  0  
Croatia 237 5.6  0  
Denmark 3,263 11.6  4 
Egypt 64 7.3  0 
Estonia 104,813 5.6  86 
Finland 2,407 11.6  2 
France 1,078 11.6  — 
Georgia 1,677 5.6  1 
Germany 8,226 5.6  2 
Greece 260 11.6  0 
Hungary 49 5.6  0 
Iceland 133 11.6  0 
Iraq 230,000 7.3  — 
Italy 793 11.6  — 
Japan 1,525 5.9  — 
Kazakhstan 7,649 7.4  15  
Kenya 100,000 17.8  1,183  
Kuwait 93,000 15.3  — 
Kyrgyzstan 24,615 7.4  47  
Latvia 344,263 5.6  277  
Liechtenstein 6 5.6  — 
Lithuania 3,902 15.3  9  
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Stateless populations in 
2009 
Stateless 
persons 
Estimated state-
less (lost both 
parents) 
Estimated 
orphaned 
stateless 
Luxembourg 177 11.6  0  
Macedonia 1,911 5.6  — 
Malaysia 40,001 7.4  52  
Moldova 2,014 5.6  2  
Mongolia 373 7.4  1  
Montenegro 1,500 5.6 — 
Nepal 800,000 7.4  1,351  
Netherlands 5,034 11.6  3  
Norway 2,860 11.6  2  
Panama 1 5.2  0  
Poland 865 5.6  1  
Portugal 31 11.6  0  
Qatar 1,200 7.3  1  
Romania 306 5.6  0  
Russian Federation 50,000 5.6 — 
Saudi Arabia 70,000 7.3 — 
Serbia 16,700 5.6  12 
Slovakia 911 5.6  1 
South Korea 103 5.9  0 
Spain 28 11.6 — 
Sweden 7,758 15.3  8 
Switzerland 67 11.6 — 
Syrian Arab Republic 300,000 7.3 — 
Tajikistan 2,626 7.4  6 
Thailand 3,500,000 7.4 5,519 
Turkey 2,739 7.3  3 
Turkmenistan 12,000 7.4 — 
Ukraine 56,500 5.6  56 
United Kingdom Northern 
Ireland 205 11.6  0 
Viet Nam 7,200 7.4  9 
Total Stateless Orphans   11,077 
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Exhibit F provides a rough but potentially conservative esti-
mate of the number of stateless orphans worldwide. First, the 
study is limited to data gathered by UNHCR. This data may 
overlook unreported countries or stateless populations. Second, 
given the vulnerability of the stateless population, stateless 
children would conceivably be more vulnerable to the loss of 
both parents. Stateless populations are often under-resourced 
and underrepresented, making them more susceptible to pov-
erty, disease, and human rights abuses.128 A hypothesis that 
stateless populations suffer a higher rate of orphaned children 
deserves closer study. 
Further, the data does not necessarily represent all adoptable 
orphans.129 Some orphans who lost both parents may have ex-
tended family (grandparents, siblings, and aunts and uncles) 
who can take them in or communities who may  act as surro-
gate families. Given that statelessness frequently occurs in 
conditions of international conflict or forced emigration, state-
less children may be more likely to lack extended family or 
community.130 Once again, a hypothesis that stateless popula-
tions have few options for local resettlement deserves further 
study. 
The formal number of estimated orphaned stateless children 
represented by Exhibit F may appear small—11,077 globally.131 
This number, however, is significant. It is almost equivalent to 
the total number of intercountry adoptions to the United States 
in 2010.132 It is also nearly three times the number of children 
adopted into the United States in 2009 from countries with 
stateless population, a total of 4589 children in 2009.133 Most 
importantly, perhaps, these orphaned stateless children are the 
most vulnerable and most in need of adoption. 
V. LEGISLATION AND INTERCOUNTRY ADOPTION 
In March 2010, the U.S. House of Representatives introduced 
a bill proposing a solution known as the “North Korean Refu-
                                                                                                             
 128. See generally Milbrandt, supra note 2. 
 129. See supra note 125. 
 130. Milbrandt, supra note 2. 
 131. See supra Exhibit F. 
 132. See Bartholet, A Way Forward, supra note 8, at 688. 
 133. See supra Exhibit A. 
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gee Adoption Act of 2010” (the “2010 Act”).134 The bill was re-
ferred to committee and reintroduced on April 8, 2011.135 The 
bill passed the House on September 11, 2012, and the Senate 
on January 1, 2013, under the new header of the “North Kore-
an Child Welfare Act of 2012” (the “2012 Act”).136 The bill “re-
quire[s] the Department of State regularly to brief appropriate 
congressional committees on efforts to advocate for and develop 
a strategy to provide assistance in the best interest of these 
children.”137 
The North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2010 legislation 
read as follows: 
 
A BILL 
To develop a strategy for assisting stateless children from 
North Korea, and for other purposes. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘North Korean Refugee Adoption 
Act of 2010’. 
SECTION 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) thousands of North Korean children do not have 
families and are threatened with starvation and dis-
ease if they remain in North Korea or as stateless ref-
ugees in surrounding countries; 
(2) thousands of United States citizens would welcome 
the opportunity to adopt North Korean orphans; and 
(3) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Home-
land Security should make every effort to facilitate 
the adoption of any eligible North Korean children. 
SECTION 3. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
                                                                                                             
 134. North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2012, H.R. 1464, 112th Cong. 
(2012) (enacted). 
 135. Id. 
 136. Id. 
 137. Id. 
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(1) FOREIGN-SENDING COUNTRY- The term ‘for-
eign-sending country’— 
(A) means— 
(i) the country of the orphan’s citizenship; or 
(ii) if the orphan is not permanently residing in the 
country of citizenship, the country of the orphan’s ha-
bitual residence; and 
(B) excludes any country to which the orphan— 
(i) travels temporarily; or 
(ii) travels as a prelude to, or in conjunction with, his 
or her adoption or immigration to the United States. 
(2) HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘Hague countries’ 
means a country that is a signatory of the Convention 
on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague on May 
29, 1993. 
(3) NON-HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘non-Hague 
country’ means a country that is not a signatory of the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation 
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, done at The 
Hague on May 29, 1993. 
SECTION 4. STRATEGY ON ADOPTION OF NORTH 
KOREAN CHILDREN BY UNITED STATES CITIZENS. 
(a) In General- The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, shall develop a 
comprehensive strategy for facilitating the adoption of 
North Korean children by United States citizens. 
(b) Considerations- In developing the strategy under 
this section, the Secretary shall— 
(1) consider the challenges that United States citizens 
would encounter in attempting to adopt children from 
North Korea who are currently living in Hague coun-
tries and non-Hague countries regardless of their le-
gal status in such countries; 
(2) propose solutions to deal with the situation in 
which a North Korean child does not have access to a 
competent authority in the foreign-sending country; 
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(3) propose solutions to deal with North Korean chil-
dren who are not considered habitual residents of the 
countries in which they are located; 
(4) evaluate alternative mechanisms for foreign-
sending countries to prove that North Korean children 
are orphans when documentation, such as birth certif-
icates, death certificates of birth parents, or orphan-
age documentation, is missing or destroyed; 
(5) provide suggestions for working with South Korea 
to establish pilot programs that identify, provide for 
the immediate care of, and assist in the international 
adoption of, orphaned North Korean children living 
within South Korea; 
(6) provide suggestions for working with aid organiza-
tions in Southeast Asia to identify and establish pilot 
programs for the identification, immediate care, and 
eventual international adoption of orphaned children 
from North Korea; 
(7) identify other countries in which large numbers of 
stateless, orphaned children are living who might be 
helped by international adoption; and 
(8) propose solutions for assisting orphaned children 
with Chinese fathers and North Korean mothers who 
are living in China and have no access to Chinese or 
North Korean resources. 
(c) Reporting Requirement- Not later than 90 days af-
ter the date of the enactment of this Act, the Secre-
tary of State shall submit to Congress a report that 
contains the details of the strategy developed under 
this section.138 
The North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012 received signifi-
cant changes from the proposed North Korean Refugee Adop-
tion Act of 2010. Notably, the new proposed law withdraws 
from an aggressive posture toward stateless children and inter-
country adoption specifically.139 In particular, the 2010 version 
of the Act mandated the development of a strategy to address 
stateless North Korean children. The 2012 Act is weaker on 
                                                                                                             
 138. North Korean Refugee Adoption Act of 2010, H.R. 4986, 111th Cong. 
(2010). 
 139. Id. 
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implementation, instead requiring regular briefings related to 
an analysis of “challenges that United States citizens would 
encounter in attempting to adopt” stateless North Korean chil-
dren. Even the modification of the title from the “Refugee 
Adoption Act” to the “Child Welfare Act” illustrates the accept-
ed Act’s weak stance toward stateless adoption in favor a 
broader posture toward general welfare.140 
HR 1464, the North Korean Child Welfare Act of 2012, reads 
as follows: 
 
An Act 
To express the sense of Congress regarding North Korean 
children and children of one North Korean parent and to re-
quire the Department of State regularly to brief appropriate 
congressional committees on efforts to advocate for and devel-
op a strategy to provide assistance in the best interest of 
these children. 
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives 
of the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘North Korean Child Welfare Act 
of 2012’. 
SEC. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) hundreds of thousands of North Korean children 
suffer from malnutrition in North Korea, and North 
Korean children or children of one North Korean par-
ent who are living outside of North Korea may face 
statelessness in neighboring countries; and 
(2) the Secretary of State should advocate for the best 
interests of these children, including, when possible, 
facilitating immediate protection for those living out-
side North Korea through family reunification or, if 
appropriate and eligible in individual cases, domestic 
or international adoption. 
SEC. 3. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
                                                                                                             
 140. H.R. 1464. 
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(1) APPROPRIATE CONGRESSIONAL 
COMMITTEES- The term ‘appropriate congressional 
committees’ means the Committee on Foreign Rela-
tions of the Senate and the Committee on Foreign Af-
fairs of the House of Representatives. 
(2) HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘Hague country’ 
means a country where the Convention on Protection 
of Children and Cooperation in Respect of Intercoun-
try Adoption, done at The Hague May 29, 1993, has 
entered into force and is fully implemented. 
(3) NON-HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘non-Hague 
country’ means a country where the Convention on 
Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect of 
Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague May 29, 
1993, has not entered into force. 
SEC. 4. BRIEFINGS ON THE WELFARE OF NORTH 
KOREAN CHILDREN. 
(a) In General- The Secretary of State shall designate 
a representative to regularly brief the appropriate 
congressional committees in an unclassified setting on 
United States Government efforts to advocate for the 
best interests of North Korean children and children 
of one North Korean parent, including efforts to ad-
dress, when appropriate, the adoption of such children 
living outside North Korea without parental care. 
(b) Contents- The Secretary’s designee shall be pre-
pared to address in each briefing the following topics: 
(1) The analysis of the Department of State of the 
challenges facing North Korean children residing out-
side North Korea and challenges facing children of 
one North Korean parent in other countries who are 
fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or de facto 
stateless persons. 
(2) Department of State efforts to advocate for the 
best interest of North Korean children residing out-
side North Korea or children of one North Korean 
parent living in other countries who are fleeing perse-
cution or are living as de jure or de facto stateless 
persons, including, when possible, efforts to address 
the immediate care and family reunification of these 
children, and, in individual cases where appropriate, 
the adoption of eligible North Korean children living 
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outside North Korea and children of one North Kore-
an parent living outside North Korea. 
(3) Department of State efforts to develop a compre-
hensive strategy to address challenges that United 
States citizens would encounter in attempting to 
adopt, via intercountry adoption, North Korean-origin 
children residing in other countries or children of one 
North Korean parent residing outside North Korea 
who are fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or 
de facto stateless persons, including efforts to over-
come the complexities involved in determining juris-
diction for best interest determinations and adoption 
processing, if appropriate, of those who habitually re-
side in a Hague country or a non-Hague country. 
(4) Department of State diplomatic efforts to encour-
age countries in which North Korean children or chil-
dren of one North Korean parent are fleeing persecu-
tion or reside as de jure or de facto stateless persons 
to resolve issues of statelessness of North Koreans re-
siding in that country. 
(5) Department of State efforts to work with the Gov-
ernment of the Republic of Korea to establish pilot 
programs that identify, provide for the immediate 
care of, and assist in the family reunification of North 
Korean children and children of one North Korean 
parent living within South Korea and other countries 
who are fleeing persecution or are living as de jure or 
de facto stateless persons.141 
VI. ANALYSIS OF NORTH KOREAN LEGISLATION 
The 2010 Act worked to aggressively develop a mechanism 
for the adoption of stateless children.142 The 2012 Act is more 
in line with the Hague Adoption Convention, prioritizing fami-
ly reunification.143 The original 2010 bill stalled in committee 
and was reintroduced in 2011 before being reconstituted 
through Senate amendments to the 2012 bill.144 The final bill 
was, perhaps, a more palatable product for Congress. The 2012 
bill appears to make few promises, instead requiring an update 
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on “efforts” to be shared at various briefing meetings. Alterna-
tively, the 2012 Act may have been aligned with the original 
drafters’ view that the aggressive language of the 2010 Act 
would be traded for the opportunity to pass the bill. Whatever 
the reason, several notable changes are apparent. 
The 2012 Act fails to define “stateless.” The breadth of defini-
tions for the terms statelessness and orphan may present chal-
lenges to the law. For instance, if the child of a mother remains 
in a host country, but the mother is deported to a hostile coun-
try, the child may not legally be an orphan, but it may be im-
possible to reunite them. Furthermore, a child may not have 
legal status in a host country, but may be receiving the same 
rights as a citizen of the host country. 
The 2012 Act seeks solely to establish a pilot program in the 
Republic of Korea. While a singular pilot program may be a 
necessary starting point, South Korea has a very limited state-
less population.145 According to the recorded population of 
stateless persons in Table F, South Korea reports 103 stateless 
persons. Using the formula presented in this Article, it is esti-
mated that none of these individuals would be orphaned chil-
dren.146 Presumably, some orphaned stateless children must 
reside in South Korea for this pilot program to be given consid-
eration. If the legislation is interpreted narrowly, the potential 
impact is likely much smaller than the regional statelessness 
dilemma, and expansion to more countries may require new 
legislation. Perhaps the legislation could be construed more 
broadly, allowing stateless children from the region to enter 
South Korea for the purpose of intercountry adoption pro-
cessing. Such a plan would circumvent probable resistance 
from the governments of Russia and China. 
VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE LEGISLATION 
Future legislation should not be limited to North Korea. 
Statelessness is a broad problem affecting millions of children, 
and the North Korean dilemma is only a small portion of the 
larger statelessness challenge. Statelessness is not a static 
problem but a shifting global issue that evolves based on con-
flicts and nation-state policies. Legislation should be drafted 
that explores the adoption of stateless people broadly, while 
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prioritizing the Hague Adoption Convention ideals of family 
reunification or resettlement in a country of origin. 
This legislation would largely circumvent the Hague Adop-
tion Convention by creating a parallel adoption system. While 
the Hague Adoption Convention governs intercountry adop-
tions between contracting states, this legislation would create 
an adoption system governed privately between two contract-
ing states. In some cases of stateless adoption, the Hague 
Adoption Convention would still apply because the stateless 
child will reside in the host country contracting to the Hague 
Adoption Convention. In many cases, particularly related to 
countries with large stateless populations, the Hague Adoption 
Convention will not apply since the host country will not have 
ratified the convention. 
The most important challenge in addressing statelessness 
through adoption is the protection of children. Intercountry 
adoption has experienced the negative effects of abuse of the 
system.147 Inherent risks exist in developing a parallel inter-
country adoption system for stateless children. Specifically, 
there is a high risk that a black market will develop for adopt-
ing children if demand from receiving states is high. 
Additionally, the definition of “foreign sending country” 
should be changed to “foreign host country.” The countries may 
not be sending the children, they may instead be disinterested 
and essentially deporting the child to the custody of the receiv-
ing country. 
“Compassionate circumstances” is inspired by a British sys-
tem for adopting stateless individuals, particularly children. 
The British system allows stateless people to become “sub-
jects.”148 This method presents an alternative method for inter-
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A person who is stateless may be eligible to be registered as a British 
subject. The Home Secretary can register any child under 18 as a 
British subject but will normally only agree to do this if: 
 at least one of the parents is a British subject; and 
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country adoption. For instance, instead of directly receiving 
stateless individuals through intercountry adoption, the state-
less person might become a subject of the receiving country, 
then be adopted domestically in the receiving country (thereby 
not triggering the Hague Adoption Convention).149 In Uganda, 
a similar mechanism for sending children to receiving countries 
is employed by foreign adopting parents to avoid the mandato-
ry three-year residency requirement to adopt.150 In Uganda, the 
adoptive parents ask for legal guardianship, which is granted 
by the court. They then take the child to the United States as 
the child’s guardian, where the adoption is then performed do-
mestically.151 
It must also be noted that stateless children may be denied 
citizenship, yet have access to basic rights as a citizen of a host 
country would. If treated as a resident, there may be no reason 
to remove the child from the host country and it may be in the 
best interest of the child to remain in the most familiar culture. 
Recommended language for addressing intercountry adoption 
of stateless persons is as follows: 
 
A BILL 
To develop a strategy for assisting stateless children. 
                                                                                                             
 the child is stateless and is not able to gain any other citizen-
ship; and 
 there are compassionate circumstances, such as the child be-
ing unable to benefit from health care or education because 
he/she does not have a passport; and 
 the family is facing deportation from the country in which 
they live and the United Kingdom is the only country they 
could go to if they were deported; and 
 the child is of good character (this applies only if the child is 
aged 10 or older). 
Id. 
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 150. See UGANDA: Intercountry Adoption, BUREAU OF CONSULAR AFFAIRS, 
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Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of 
the United States of America in Congress assembled, 
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE. 
This Act may be cited as the ‘Stateless Children Adoption 
Act’. 
SECTION. 2. SENSE OF CONGRESS. 
It is the sense of Congress that— 
(1) millions of children worldwide do not have families 
and are threatened with lack of access to education, 
healthcare, and regular deportation if they remain as 
orphaned, stateless refugees; 
(2) thousands of United States citizens would welcome 
the opportunity to adopt orphans; 
(3) intercountry adoption is growing increasingly 
scarce as sending nations reduce mechanisms for 
child adoption and politicize intercountry adoption; 
and 
(4) the Secretary of State and the Secretary of Home-
land Security should make every effort to facilitate 
the adoption of any eligible stateless children. 
SECTION. 3. DEFINITIONS. 
In this Act: 
(1) FOREIGN-SENDING COUNTRY- The term ‘for-
eign-sending country’— 
(A) means— 
(i) the country of the orphan’s habitual or emergency 
residence; and 
(B) excludes any country to which the orphan— 
(i) travels temporarily; or 
(ii) travels as a prelude to, or in conjunction with, his 
or her adoption or immigration to the United States. 
(2) STATELESS - The term ‘stateless’— 
(A) means— 
(i) an orphan who does not have a county of perma-
nent citizenship; 
(B) because 
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(i) operation of law in their country of birth prevents 
obtaining legal citizenship; or 
(ii) the orphan’s country of birth or country of perma-
nent citizenship no longer exists; and 
(C) compassionate circumstances exist, such as the 
child being unable to benefit from healthcare or edu-
cation due to status as a stateless person. 
(3) HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘Hague countries’ 
means a country that is a signatory of the Convention 
on Protection of Children and Cooperation in Respect 
of Intercountry Adoption, done at The Hague on May 
29, 1993. 
(4) NON-HAGUE COUNTRY- The term ‘non-Hague 
country’ means a country that is not a signatory of the 
Convention on Protection of Children and Cooperation 
in Respect of Intercountry Adoption, done at The 
Hague on May 29, 1993. 
SECTION. 4. STRATEGY ON ADOPTION OF 
STATELESS CHILDREN BY UNITED STATES 
CITIZENS. 
(a) In General- The Secretary of State, in consultation 
with the Secretary of Homeland Security and the Sec-
retary of Health and Human Services, shall develop a 
comprehensive strategy for facilitating the adoption of 
stateless orphaned children by United States citizens. 
(b) Considerations- In developing the strategy under 
this section, the Secretary shall— 
(1) identify countries in which large numbers of state-
less, orphaned children are living; 
(2) collaborate with foreign host countries to provide 
immediate care to stateless children and families and 
assist in accessing resources for family reunification, 
or obtaining citizenship in their countries of birth, 
countries of habitual residence, or countries of emer-
gency residence; 
(3) collaborate with foreign host countries to establish 
pilot programs that identify, provide for the immedi-
ate care of, and assist in the international adoption of 
orphaned stateless children living within their bor-
ders who cannot be reunified with family or properly 
cared for in the host country; 
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(4) collaborate with aid organizations to identify and 
establish pilot programs for the identification, imme-
diate care, and eventual international adoption of or-
phaned stateless children; 
(5) develop a mechanism for foreign-sending countries 
to prove that stateless children are orphans when 
documentation, such as birth certificates, death certif-
icates of birth parents, or orphanage documentation, 
is missing or destroyed; 
(6) develop a solution for United States citizens to 
adopt stateless children who are currently living in 
Hague countries and non-Hague countries regardless 
of their legal status in such countries. 
In practice, the greatest challenge for legislation and a pro-
gram for adopting the stateless will be accurately determining 
who is, and who is not, an orphan. The risk in adopting the 
stateless is that non-orphaned children have the potential to be 
exploited for adoption. Despite the risks, a solution will only 
come through experimentation with programs determining the 
adoptability of stateless children. 
The legislation this Article recommends would open the op-
portunity for the adoption of stateless children more broadly, 
allowing for adoption demand to address shifting statelessness 
dilemmas. Furthermore, the recommended legislation would 
more aggressively pursue the development of a legal mecha-
nism for stateless adoption. This legislation would accomplish 
many of the goals of the North Korean legislation while simul-
taneously opening doors to other sending nations. 
CONCLUSION 
Adoption of stateless children is not a first choice option. The 
preferred response is that a child be reunified with its family. 
However, when reunification is not an option, nations should 
prioritize local and community adoption in the country where 
the child resides. Unfortunately, there are circumstances 
where the community response is hostile and unworkable; in 
those cases, intercountry adoption may be the best solution. 
Intercountry adoption is seen as an option when all other op-
tions have been exhausted. In many cases, the options for 
stateless children will indeed be exhausted and intercountry 
adoption will be the only solution for the protection of their 
2014] ADOPTING THE STATELESS 743 
best interests. The greatest hurdle to adopting the stateless is 
the lack of an authorized channel to facilitate this process. Leg-
islation will be needed to explore this solution and open the 
pathway for this form of adoption. Within that channel, the 
challenge will be determining whether the child is indeed an 
orphan, particularly when stateless circumstances provide lit-
tle or no paper trail on the child’s history. Nonetheless, we will 
not develop a caring response to stateless children without ex-
perimentation and innovation. Exploring legislation and a new 
legal mechanism will do just that, and it will present a life-
changing, and potentially life-saving, opportunity to thousands 
of stateless orphans. 
